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Abstract
The importance of President Clinton’s visit to Bucharest goes far beyond the symbolism repre-
sented by the first visit of an American president to a free and democratic Romania. “Euro-Atlantic
integration” does not start when a country states its commitment to being a candidate for North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (’NATO’) or European Union (’EU’) membership and does not end
with the moment of accession. Among Central European nations, accession to NATO has enjoyed
the greatest public support in Romania. Romania’s integration into the European Union is the
other foreign policy goal that, together with accession to NATO, is considered indispensable to
Romania’s development as a stable and prosperous free market democracy. Romania took advan-
tage of the instruments set up by the EU which are meant to assist Central European associated
countries in their preparation for accession. Economic integration does not take place overnight;
negotiations for accession to the EU of Finland, Sweden and Austria – prosperous European na-
tions and former European Free Trade Agreement (”EFTA”) members – lasted for four years. The
prospect of EU membership has been a main factor that has enabled Romania to become a member
of Central European Free Trade Area (”CEFTA”).
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On July 11, 1997, only two days after the conclusion of the
NATO Summit in Madrid, President Clinton paid a one day visit
to Bucharest where he met Romanian President Emil Constan-
tinescu. The importance of this event goes far beyond the sym-
bolism represented by the first visit of an American president to
a free and democratic Romania.
Romania's invitation to start negotiations for accession to
NATO has been denied by the alliance in Madrid. Most of the
European allies have strongly supported Romania's candidacy
but the United States favored a limited first round of expansion.
Only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were eventually
invited. This decision has been largely perceived by the
Romanian public as an oversight.
Many observers feared that disappointment and frustration
might generate a "cold" reaction from the Romanians during
the visit of the American president to Bucharest. Yet, an enthusi-
astic, cheering crowd of more than 40,000 gathered in the Uni-
versity Square to attend the speech of Bill Clinton. How was that
possible?
I. EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION: NATO AND
EU ADAPTATION
After 1990, for Central European nations, accession to
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and the Euro-
pean Union ("EU") has become a main focus. Membership in
these structures is considered a genuine "ticket to success." The
approach has strong motivations.
NATO is the symbol of force and stability. It represents the
most successful military alliance in history and has prevented de-
structive war with its security and defense umbrella over Western
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Europe. NATO means a U.S. presence in Europe, which still
has, after the end of the Cold War, a tremendous role in the
stability of the continent (for example, the leading United States
role in resolving the crisis in Bosnia). The alliance has ensured
the democratic stability of its members. Inclusion of Spain in
NATO in 1982 came after long years of dictatorship, and its
membership has since become an important factor for the stabil-
ity of Spain's democracy.
The EU is the symbol of integration and economic prosper-
ity. While economic integration and the single market have cre-
ated the most important economic and trade actor in the world,
the EU Member States are European models of democracy and
stability. The European Community was the linking element
that reintegrated West Germany with the other European de-
mocracies and put the special Franco-German relationship in
the core of the future European development. Inclusions of
Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the European Community re-
sulted in the consolidation of democracy and stability of these
countries that had abandoned totalitarian regimes, as well as in
their spectacular and steady economic development.
Both organizations are based on, and defend, the same set
of fundamental values: stability, democracy, rule of law, and free
market economy. These values are the real source of solidarity
that characterizes their members. These values illustrate how ex-
pansion is a natural and logical process of reintegrating the Cen-
tral European nations into the Euro-Atlantic community. The
Central European nations share a commitment to these values
and have the ability to defend them.
What is "Euro-Atlantic Integration?" In the United States,
the concept is rarely used. In Western Europe, a much more
consecrated terminology is "European integration," defining the
sophisticated functioning of the EU system which led to the "ac-
quis communautaire."' In Central Europe, "Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration" refers to the process of enlargement of both NATO and
EU to the East or, generally, to the efforts of Central European
1. See Roger T. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1092, 1140-1157 (1995).
"This term, so hard to translate that the French is invariably used even in English texts,
means essentially that the intrinsic core of the Community (now the 'Union') legal and
political structure is a given ('acquis') which the new Member State must accept, not
challenge or call into question." Id. at 1141.
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nations to reconnect themselves to the Western community. In
my view, this last concept covers a much broader area, and could
very well characterize the whole process of NATO and EU post-
Cold War adaptation.
Integration is a process, not a moment. "Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration" does not start when a country states its commitment to
being a candidate for NATO or EU membership and does not
end with the moment of accession. It covers the whole sequence
of cooperation - enhanced partnership - membership -
deepening integration. All European countries are at some
point in that sequence. Ukraine, a country that has not yet
made up its mind to become a candidate for NATO or EU mem-
bership, but has already developed a close cooperation with both
institutions, and France, a founding member of NATO and EU
that currently aims at rejoining the NATO integrated command
structure and at fulfilling the convergence criteria for EU, are
both in a process of "Euro-Atlantic integration."
Some might argue that "integration" is a concept that might
characterize the EU, but certainly not NATO, even with regard to
its enlargement. NATO is a military defense alliance, where all de-
cisions are taken by consensus of its sixteen members. Critics argue
that you may 'join" NATO, but you do not "integrate" into NATO.
It is true that during the Cold War period NATO was a pure
defense alliance. It is also true that NATO has, and will continue to
have, the important role of a military alliance responsible for the
defense of its members. But NATO is already more than that; it is a
system that makes vital political decisions regarding the security
and stability not only of its members but of all of Europe. Whether
some will like it or not, the political dimension, not the military
one, will characterize the alliance's activity more and more. The
whole NATO post-1990 evolution proves it. The process of enlarge-
ment, North American Cooperation Council ("NACC") 9 and now
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ("EAPC"),' NATO-Russia
Council,4 NATO-Russia Founding Act,5 NATO-Ukraine Charter,6
2. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is an outcome of the merger between
the Partnership for Peace ("PFP") and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
("NACC"). The NACC is a forum in which allies can offer their experience and expert
advice to partner countries on security issues. S. TREArY Doc. No. 25, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., at V-VII (1994).
3. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is composed of the North Atlantic Coop-
eration Council and the PFP.
4. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, 36 I.L.M. 1006, 1010 (1997).
5. The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Secur-
ity, 36 I.L.M. 1006 (1997).
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even the Partnership for Peace ("PFP") ,7 have first and foremost a
political dimension and political goals. These initiatives have cre-
ated deep relations among participants, and, although decisions
within NATO are still taken at a strict-intergovernmental level, the
evolution of the alliance might be considered as a "movement" to-
ward integration.
The United States is also in a process of "Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion" even beyond NATO. After the 1995 signing of the New Trans-
atlantic Agenda,8 the United States and the EU have linked their
economies tighter, strengthening the world's biggest commercial
relationship. And this relationship will develop not only toward
free trade but also toward integration. A "Transatlantic Economic
Community" or even a "Euro-Atlantic Union" might be the NATOs
or the EUs of the future.
Enlargements of NATO and the EU develop in close connec-
tion with the overall adaptation of these institutions to post-Cold
War evolutions. Central European nations seeking membership
have to join two very dynamic systems. That is why the task is very
difficult. Their preparation must not only aim at reaching present
standards, but also keep pace with the current process of adapta-
tion. For instance, in their preparation, in addition to the efforts to
achieve the "classic" military interoperability with NATO, candi-
dates must also create and train their armed forces in order to be
able to participate in Rapid Reaction-type operations, which is part
of a new NATO concept. EU candidates must not only harmonize
their legislation to the present EU legislation, but also prepare
themselves to cope with the rapid development of "third pillar" pol-
6. NATO-Ukraine Charter Madrid, 9 July 1997 <<http://www.tryzub.com/
UKRAINE/Statement/10html>>.
7. Partnership For Peace Invitation Issued by Heads of State and Government par-
ticipating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,Jan. 11, 1994, reprinted in NATO
Partnership For Peace I (NATO, 1994). The Heads of State of NATO nations created
the PFP as an "immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship
between NATO and participating states. This new program goes beyond dialogue and
cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace." Captain Davis
Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.' L. Rev. 235, 254
(1997). The objectives of PFP were to commit to openness of national defense plan-
ning and budgeting, to keep the military under "democratic," or "civilian" control, to
maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations, to develop military
relations with NATO, and to promote long-term development of interoperability with
NATO forces. Id. (citing NATO Partnership For Peace 1 (NATO, 1994)).
8. The New Transatlantic Agenda, Vol. 6, No. 49 U.S. Department of State Dis-
patch, 894-96, Dec. 4, 1995. "At the Madrid Summit on December 3, the European
Union and the United States agreed on a 'Transatlantic Agenda' to improve political
ties and economic relations." John R. Schmartz and Mike Meier, "New Transatlantic
Agenda" Agreed to by EU and U.S., 2 INT'L. L. UPDATE 12, 12 (1996). The Transatlantic
Agenda addresses the Peace process in former Yugoslavia, a common security policy,
measures against international crime, environmental protection, as well as a "new trans-
atlantic market place" to improve mutual trade and investment. Id.
1997]
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icies (regarding justice and home affairs) or to adapt their financial
policies to the future EU. That is why enlargement and adaptation
are "interlocking processes."
II. ROMANIA AND NATO
For post-1990 Romanian governments, Romania's accession
to NATO has been a major political goal. Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion is considered a question of national interest. Among Cen-
tral European nations, accession to NATO has enjoyed the
greatest public support in Romania.
Several arguments support the idea that Romania satisfies
the NATO accession criteria stated by former Secretary of De-
fense William Perry, including a consolidated democracy, a free
economy, good neighborly relations, civilian control on the mili-
tary, and interoperability with NATO forces.
" Romania has fully proven the stability and maturity of its
democracy; in November 1996, free and fair general elec-
tions took place for the third time after 1989. The last
elections led to major alternation into power.
• The new reform-oriented Government is implementing a
very ambitious and aggressive economic program aimed at
a rapid culmination of privatization and restructuring of
the Romanian economy.
* Romania has good relations with its neighbors and has
concluded, in less than a year, very important basic bilat-
eral treaties with Hungary and Ukraine. Romania has
good relations with all the Balkan countries (including
Greece, Turkey, and the former Yugoslav republics).
* Romanian military, police, and intelligence structures
have been put under complete civilian control.
* Romania has achieved a remarkable degree of interoper-
ability with NATO forces, and many efforts are dedicated
to this end. Romania has shown its willingness to contrib-
ute to international peace efforts by actively participating
in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Albania, the Gulf,
Angola, and Somalia. Romania has highly trained and ex-
perienced armed forces for these types of operations, in-
cluding a newly created Rapid Reaction Force.
Romania was the first country to sign in 1995 the Partnership for
Peace, which is considered to be a useful preparatory stage to-
wards membership, and has been one of the most active partici-
pants in this program.
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Moreover, Romania enjoys a very interesting strategic loca-
tion, which, along with its other assets, makes it an important
stability provider in the area. NATO membership would
strengthen this role:
* Romania, Poland, and Hungary are Ukraine's "interface"
with Europe. Their accession to NATO would strengthen
Ukraine's independence and stability, which are crucial
for Europe's security.
* While accession of Poland and the Czech Republic to the
alliance would consolidate the central and northern flank
of NATO, inclusion of Romania, Hungary, and Slovenia
would strengthen the southern flank. Its consolidation is
important, considering that future threats to European se-
curity will come from the south and the south-east of the
continent.
* NATO membership for Romania, Hungary, and Slovenia
would project stability over the Balkans, preventing at the
same time any possible projection of instability from the
Balkans to Central Europe.
" By its location "at the crossroads," Romania can be an im-
portant element in stopping the penetration toward West-
ern Europe of the new security threats such as terrorism,
organized crime, arms traffic, smuggling, and drug traffic.
At the Madrid NATO Summit, despite its attractive offer,
and despite a strong support for immediate membership (eleven
out of sixteen allies favored its inclusion in the first round of
NATO enlargement). Romania (along with Slovenia) has not
reached the consensus necessary to be invited to start negotia-
tions for accession with the alliance. Only three Central Euro-
pean candidates were invited: Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary.
Why was Romania not included in the first round of NATO
expansion?
First, Romania's spectacular progress has not been as consis-
tent as in the case of the Madrid three invitees. The democratic
alternation into power, demonstrating a functional democracy
in Romania, occurred only after the November 1996 elections.
The conclusion of bilateral basic treaties with Hungary took
place in September 1996 and with Ukraine in June 1997. The
implementation of a firm program of economic reform aiming
at a speedy restructuring of the economy and at the complete
1997]
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opening of Romanian markets to trade and foreign investors
started at the beginning of this year. It is understandable why a
year ago no political analysts in the United States or in any other
allied country anticipated such a positive evolution.
Second, the Allies considered that a smaller group of invi-
tees would be easier to be "swallowed" by NATO. Important or-
ganizational and technical questions must be clarified in order
to adapt NATO structures to an enlarged alliance. The question
of costs of expansion also influenced the Madrid decision sub-
stantially, and burden sharing will be a serious question of con-
cern in the ratification process, especially in the United States.
Third, a limited first round expansion, leaving out uncon-
testedly valid candidates such as Romania and Slovenia, not only
emphasizes the "open door" character of enlargement, but
makes it easier to frame a second round in terms of timing and
countries to be invited. If its steady progress as a stable and relia-
ble partner of NATO continues, Romania will be a leading can-
didate for the second round of enlargement, which may start in
1999. The timing will very much depend on the successful con-
clusion of the first round.
Ratification in the U.S. Senate will have paramount impor-
tance for the subsequent steps in the process. The debate in the
Senate will not only deal with specific issues directly related to
expansion, such as costs. But will deal with the future U.S. policy
in Europe. Questions regarding U.S. involvement in crisis man-
agement in Europe, burden sharing, the role of European allies
in European defense, and the role of the EU in security and de-
fense will be approached in this debate. The U.S. strategy in
Europe for the next century will be framed within this debate.
III. ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Romania's integration into the European Union is the
other foreign policy goal that, together with accession to NATO,
is considered indispensable to Romania's development as a sta-
ble and prosperous free market democracy. Romania has been,
since February 1, 1995, associated with the EU by a Europe
Agreement, whose provisions regarding all the issues of eco-
nomic and financial cooperation, approximation of laws, and
full trade liberalization have established a strengthened progres-
sive cooperation at both political and economic levels between
[Vol. 21:12
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Romania and the EU.9 The aim of association is to gradually
integrate Romania with the Union.
Romania took advantage of the instruments set up by the
EU which are meant to assist Central European associated coun-
tries in their preparation for accession. There are three catego-
ries of such instruments: strategies and programs for the candi-
dates (most of them elaborated by the European Commission);
structured political dialogue ("15+10") ° at ministerial levels,
aimed to evaluate and further develop the EU-associates rela-
tions; and the PHARE11 program and other programs of assist-
ance. In its recently released "Agenda 2000," the European
Commission has evaluated the economic performances of all the
candidates to accession. Following this evaluation, the Commis-
sion has recommended to the EU Council to start negotiation
for accession with five Central European countries: Poland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. Romania is
not among the first invitees, and the reason is clear: its poor
economic performances.
If the most difficult problems for NATO enlargement are
political and strategic ones, including relations with Russia,
maintaining the alliance's defense capability, burden sharing be-
tween the United States and the European allies, EU expansion
problems are mainly economic and institutional ones. Key to
the EU's prosperity and internal cohesion is the sophisticated
economic integration among its members. To be a member of
the EU is to be part of a system that cannot function if one of its
elements does not function properly. That is why membership
in the EU requires high economic performances, enabling the
absorption of the "acquis communautaire" and competition in
the Internal Market.
Although some of the "Agenda 2000" assumptions regard-
ing Romania's evaluation might be questionable, one point is
clear: Romania's economy is not prepared to join the EU. Yet,
9. 1995 WL 920278 (Apr 10, 1995). Romania entered into this agreement, also
called the "European Association Agreement" ("FAA"), on Feb. 1, 1995. Id. These
agreements are based on the principles of respect for human rights, the values of plu-
ralist democracy, the role of law, and the market economy. Id.
10. This refers to structured political dialogue, at the ministerial level for Central
European Countires desiring entry into European Union.
11. 1995 WL 918808 (desribing national and regional technical assistance pro-
grams).
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negotiations for accession should start simultaneously with all
the Central European candidates. Such a decision should take
into account more of the political motivations and less of the
economic ones. The economic gap between the poorest EU
member and the best prepared candidate is far larger than the
distance separating the best and the least prepared candidate.
Differentiation of the candidates can be determined only during
complex and lengthy negotiations, and reflected especially by
the transition periods established by negotiations. Economic in-
tegration does not take place overnight; negotiations for acces-
sion to the EU of Finland, Sweden and Austria - prosperous
European nations and former European Free Trade Agreement
("EFTA") members - lasted for four years. Membership in the
EU does not necessarily mean immediate and full participation
in all the EU policies. Establishing transition periods for new
Central European members is inevitable, taking into account the
level of their economic development. Poorer members of the
EU were allowed to gradually integrate after accession: Spain, for
instance, has enjoyed a transition period of sixteen years with
regard to the EU fishing policy. Some of the EU policies them-
selves have to be restructured in the prospect of enlargement.
The common agricultural policy, and the structural funds policy
are examples. That is why at this point in the process the deci-
sion of the EU Council to be taken at the meeting in Luxemburg
in December should mainly take into account the political con-
siderations.
IV. ECONOMIC REFORM AND EURO-ATLANTIC
INTEGRATION
The present level of Romania's economic development has
not exactly been an asset in support of Romania's process of in-
tegration. There are, nevertheless, very good reasons to be opti-
mistic with respect to Romania's chances in a rapid economic
recovery and growth. After 1989, Romania's transition to a free
market economy was more difficult in the other Central Euro-
pean countries. Romania's isolation during the totalitarian com-
munist era resulted in a chaotic and non-competitive economy.
The central economic planners totally ignored the evolution oc-
curring in the international market and blocked access of
Romanian industry to modern technology. The heavy burden of
[Vol. 21:12
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the communist heritage was reflected in the first years of post-
communism. While pluralism and democratic institutions have
been rapidly established, the economic reform was inconsistent
and slower than, for instance, that in the Czech Republic or Po-
land.
The president and parties forming the present governmen-
tal coalition in Romania won the November 1996 elections be-
cause they presented to the people an aggressive but at the same
time coherent program of economic reforms. Key to the pro-
gram which is supported by international financial organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
are measures aiming at a complete and rapid privatization and
economic restructuring. No more governmental subsidies are
directed to public companies. Measures have been adopted to
reform the banking and financial system so that competition is
encouraged and inefficiency is discouraged. Both domestic and
foreign investors are presently stimulated by attractive taxes and
customs facilities. Foreign investments and capital in the
Romanian market have rapidly increased after last year's elec-
tions. Remarkable results have already been registered in fight-
ing against corruption.
Along with these positive developments, the commitment of
the Romanian Government and the support of the public for
reform, as well as Romania's important economic potential, are
premises for a rapid and healthy economic recovery and growth
in the near future. Euro-Atlantic integration and economic re-
form are inseparable concepts. Success in one of them depends
on performances in the other. Neither of them is a goal in itself;
the real goal is democratic stability and economic prosperity.
Euro-Atlantic integration is not only a guarantee for a successful
democratic and economic reform in Romania, but also a guaran-
tee for the future. Integration has already been an important
incentive and instrument to support and accelerate reform in
Romania.
Since a robust developing market economy is an important
criterion for membership in both NATO and the EU, the pros-
pect of accession has been an incentive for the acceleration of
economic reform. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Treasury Larry
Summers has suggested, the prospect of NATO enlargement has
helped lock-in Central Europe's practices of market economy.
Of course, the idea is perfectly valid for the EU as well.
1997]
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Accession to NATO and the EU has been an important if
not decisive incentive for the conclusion of bilateral treaties be-
tween Romania and Hungary, and between Romania and
Ukraine. The prospect of EU membership has been a main fac-
tor that has enabled Romania to become a member of Central
European Free Trade Area ("CEFTA"). Benefits of regional co-
operation and liberalization have been rediscovered through
CEFTA. Integration has been a concrete and effective instru-
ment of Romanian reform because the close relationship be-
tween Romania and Euro-Atlantic institutions, namely NATO
and the EU, does not consist only in a strengthened political
partnership but also in concrete economic cooperation and
assistance. PHARE is such an example.
CONCLUSION
A hierarchy between these two fundamental goals of
Romania, accession to NATO and to the EU, cannot be drawn.
Both of them are indispensable to Romania's national interests.
The two processes of enlargement are interrelated, but not inter-
dependent. To become a member of both organizations,
Romania has to fulfill the same conditions. There are of course
certain distinctions: while NATO accession requires the reform
of the armed forces, EU membership cannot be accomplished
without harmonizing domestic laws and regulations according to
EU legislation. But integration in NATO and the EU requires
nothing more and nothing less than that which Romania should
achieve and is achieving anyway: democratic and economic re-
form. Although support of the Western partners is important,
Romania's own efforts are decisive for the consolidation of de-
mocracy and for the development of an open, modern and pros-
perous economy. The Romanian people and Government know
this very well, and they also know that if the same commitment
and efforts continue, integration in NATO and EU will come as a
natural result.
This was the message the U.S. President brought with him
to Bucharest. The "strategic partnership" offered to Romania on
this occasion proves not only the importance the United States
attaches to Romania's role in the stability of the area, but also
illustrates U.S. confidence in Romania's political and economic
[Vol. 21:12
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development. In this endeavor, Romania can rely on the sup-
port of its Western partners and especially on U.S. support.
